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After sixty years of predominance in the western countries, both the objective of economic 
growth and its core measure, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), have been questioned. It no 
longer seems consistent to maintain growth as a societal goal and to keep GDP as the major 
reference for socioeconomic policies. Numerous alternative indicators have been suggested. 
These new indicators potentially constitute a great opportunity for change: it is now broadly 
accepted that what we measure affects what we do. We go a step further, claiming that the way we 
measure it is just as crucial: indicators intrinsically carry axiological and normative conceptions, 
embedded in the specific way they are built. As indicators are increasingly being used for shaping 
political ends, light should be shed on these underlying conceptions. Our analysis of the Adjusted 
Net Savings (ANS, the sustainability indicator proposed by the World Bank) attempts to illustrate 
these normative underpinnings, often obscured by technical concerns around the numbers. By 
systematically deconstructing the ANS, from its conceptual framework to its sub-dimensions, we 
shed light on the singular and debatable – productivist – conception of ‘sustainability’ (in its 
human and ecological aspects) encompassed in the ANS. This exercise aims to provide an insight 
into the societal values embedded in such indicators, which can strongly influence decision-
making. 
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For over sixty years, the objective of economic growth, quantitatively assessed by the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), has been pivotal within the elaboration of socioeconomic policies in 
capitalist economies. Created in the specific post-World War II context, national accounting 
systems – whose major indicator is GDP – were largely shaped to respond to the urgent need for 
reconstruction and for building a new image of national power (Fourquet, 1980). From then 
onwards, GDP has progressively become a central beacon in policy-making. Economic growth as 
a goal for socioeconomic policies was enhanced owing to a broad acceptation of the link between 
market production and social progress. Such a vision of progress was enrooted in social pacts 
ensuring a balanced share of the value produced between labour and capital.  
 
Today however, the environmental and social impacts of a sixty-year economic growth have led 
to a historical turning point: it is no longer possible to maintain growth as an implicit societal 
goal. Nor is it consistent to keep GDP as the major reference for socioeconomic policies. GDP 
has been unable to tackle central issues related to the quality and sustainability of people and 
societies’ ways of life. Nor has it been able to alert against the rise of many crises factors, such as 
demonstrated by the recent financial and economic crises. 
 
Many debates have risen to discuss possible ways to go beyond this key indicator, gathering 
actors of various horizons: citizens, politics, economic institutions and academics
1. From these 
debates, new alternatives and/or complements to GDP have emerged
2. The growing interest in the 
research for new indicators, stepped up for now fifteen years, and the fact that it is taken into 
account more often by powerful institutions constitute significant phenomena: new indicators of 
“progress” are to play a growing role in the public sphere. On one hand, they constitute important 
beacons for leading policies. On the other hand, and more fundamentally, indicators of “progress” 
implicitly contribute to the definition of “progress”. The choice of an indicator (or set of 
indicators) carries much values and world visions.  
 
Yet, the current debates on new indicators have the singularity of merging questions of finalities 
(what is a desirable society? what is progress?) and questions of methodology (how to measure 
progress?). While issues of finalities naturally require the legitimacy of a transparent debate, 
questions of method rather seem to constitute the traditional duty of experts. These two kinds of 
questions being uneasily distinguished, the risk is high to see the former being absorbed by the 
latter, leaving to experts the choice of a measure of “progress”, indirectly allowing them to decide 
                                                 
1 Among the main initiatives, let us point out the following :  
-  OECD 3
rd World Forum, “Charting Progress, Building Visions, Improving lives”, October 2009, 
Busan, Korea; 
-  “Commission on the measurement of economic performance and social progress”; 
-  EU parliament international conference (in collaboration with OECD and WWF), “Beyond GDP”, 
November 2007, Brussels, Belgium. 
-  OECD 2
nd World Forum, “Measuring and Fostering the Progress of Societies”, June 2007, 
Istanbul, Turkey. 
2 For a good overview of the main alternative indicators currently on the table, see Gadrey, J. and Jany-
Catrice, F. (2007). 
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what “progress” is and/or should be. To avoid such a democratic deficiency to happen, it is 
crucial to clarify the normative foundations and implications of new indicators of “progress”, that 
is, to decrypt what values and visions of the world numbers implicitly carry.  
 
There is a growing acceptance of the fact that the choice of a measure is intrinsically normative. 
“What we measure affects what we do; and if our measurements are flawed, decisions may be 
distorted” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.7). Going a step further, we think that the way we measure it 
can suggest different insights on the direction(s) that should be taken in the pursuit of “progress”. 
Though, the growing influence of what we take into account and how we do it is too often 
occulted behind methodological concerns. This is what we shall illustrate in the paper, by 
deconstructing an indicator at each step of its elaboration (from its upriver theoretical/conceptual 
framework to its downriver sub-dimensions) to put into light the range of implicit values that 
underlie a quantitative measure, too often presented as being neutral
3.  
 
The indicator chosen here is the Adjusted Net Savings (ANS, also known as Genuine Savings). 
This indicator benefits from a very high visibility.  It has been developed by the World Bank and 
estimated for more than 190 countries over the period 1970-2006
4. Furthermore, it has been 
praised by many economists as being anchored in a coherent theoretical framework, being 
therefore a better indicator than many other composite “sustainability” indicators. What is more, 
the ANS has been assigned with a clear political role. The ANS “seeks to provide national-level 
decision makers with a clear, relatively simple indicator of how sustainable their country’s 
investment policies are” (Bolt et al., 2002, p.4).  It has also been suggested, in the – potentially 
influential – Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social 
Progress, as having to appear (conditionally to some modifications) in a restricted dashboard of 
indicators (Stiglitz et al. 2009). Furthermore, the United Nations Organization has been working 
on integrating ANS estimates into its official national guidelines (UNSD, 1993), which might 
enhance this indicator’s impact on global policy-making (Ferreira and Vincent, 2005). As this 
indicator is to influence policy conclusions, namely at the World Bank level, its potential impact 
on many countries deserves that transparency be made on its normative aspects. This 
transparency has been pointed out by the members of FAIR
5 as a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for the ANS to be legitimately adopted as a new policy tool.  
 
The paper first recalls how ANS is elaborated. The next sections are dedicated to the implicit 
values and norms carried by theoretical and methodological choices. Section 2 approaches the 
normative implications of the theoretical framework underlying the ANS. Section 3 discusses the 
assumption of substitutability between capitals. Sections 4, 5 and 6 focus on three specific 
dimensions of the ANS. Firstly, the way human resources are accounted is questioned. Secondly, 
                                                 
3 Each of the normative issues presented here deserves a further analysis on its. But such an analysis goes 
beyond the scope of this paper, the aim of which being to draw a synthetic outline of the normative issues 
at stake in quantification processes. 
4 The ANS estimates can be downloaded from :  http://go.worldbank.org/VLJHBLZP71 
5 FAIR, Forum pour d’autres indicateurs de richesse. We are particularly indebted to Jean Gadrey, 
Florence Jany-Catrice, Dominique Méda, Pascal Petit and Patrick Viveret for their enriching opinions on 
the ANS. 
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the estimation of natural resources depletion is examined as well as its imputation. Finally, the 
computation of the pollution damages is assessed. Section 7 concludes. 
1  The Adjusted Net Savings: an Index of “Sustainability” 
 
 
The ANS is an indicator of sustainability. It aims to give an account of the net creation or 
destruction of the national wealth, on a yearly basis. In the ANS, wealth is enlarged to include, 
besides produced assets, natural resources, environmental quality and human capital. Derived 
from standard national accounting measures of gross national savings, the ANS operates four 
types of adjustment (figure 1). First, estimates of the consumption of fixed capital are deducted to 
obtain net national savings. Second, current non-fixed capital expenditures on education are 
added to reflect the investment in human capital. Third, estimates of the depletion of different 
natural resources are subtracted to present the decline in asset values associated with their 
extraction and harvest. Eventually, global pollution damages from carbon dioxide emissions are 
deducted (Bolt et al., 2002; Stiglitz et al., 2009).  
 
Figure 1: Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) 
 
Source: World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/ 
 
All these capitals variations are expressed in a common monetary unit, as a percentage of gross 
national income (GNI) and summed up:  
GNI
CD R CSE D GNS
ANS
i n h    
  ,  
where  
ANS = Adjusted Net Savings Rate 
GNS = Gross National Saving 
Dh = Depreciation of produced capital 
CSE = Current (non-fixed-capital) expenditure on education 
Rn,i = Rent from depletion of natural capital i  
CD = Damages from carbon dioxide emissions 
GNI = Gross National Income at Market Prices 
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As the ANS represents the variation of wealth, a negative value of this indicator sends the 
message that it will not be possible to maintain current consumption levels over the future.   
2  The Neoclassical Conceptual Framework of the ANS 
 
 
The conceptual framework in which an indicator is anchored is worthwhile considering for it 
encompasses, within its axiomatic, normative elements that are per se debatable. Upstream of any 
technical choice, the theoretical frameworks from which indicators derive carry a singular world 
vision that deserves being highlighted as soon as indicators are to be used or understood in terms 
of societal finalities. This section explores the conception of sustainability underlying the ANS 
(2.1.) and then critically discusses the implications of such a conception (2.2.).  
2.1  The Conception of “Sustainability” Underlying the ANS 
 
The very first formulations of the ANS (gross savings adjusted for the loss of various assets), as a 
measure improving the traditional measures of savings, appear in Pearce and Atkinson (1993), 
Hamilton (1993) and Hamilton (1994) and Hamilton, Pearce and Atkinson (1997). A more formal 
basis to the ANS is to be found in Hamilton and Clemens (1999), where the authors more 
rigorously present the adjustments to be done to savings measures to come to a more 
comprehensive indicator. All these contributions, enrooted in the theoretical green accounting and 
social welfare literature
6, provide suggestions for an indicator of sustainability: a measure that 
would account for the value of living and non-living natural resources depletion, environmental 
degradation and for the investment in human capital (Pearce and Atkinson, 1993). This new type 
of measure was perceived and justified as contributing to enrich national accounting, enabling 
along the way a better conceptualization of “sustainable development”. 
 
Whatever the different modalities of net savings measures across the new green accounting 
literature, the ANS is commonly built, following Hartwick (1990), on the basis of an 
intertemporal optimization problem. Wealth is defined as the present value of welfare, 
(understood as the utility of a representative agent), the latter depending on both consumption and 
environmental services
7. Wealth should be maximized subject to a constraint of production 
function that combines produced, environmental and human assets
8. Production yields a 
composite good and leads to pollution emissions, which may be abated by some input of the 
composite good (Hamilton, Atkinson, Pearce, 1997).  
 
The ANS results from solving this optimization problem. It is identified as the investment (in 
produced and human capital, from which the value of depletion of natural resources and 
accumulated pollutants is deducted) that sustains intertemporal welfare maximization. This 
                                                 
6 Weitzman (1976), Dasgupta and Heal (1979), Hartwick (1990) and Mäler (1991) constitute seminal 
contributions in this field. 
7 These “services” have to be understood as positively affecting utility in the case of natural resources (as, 
for instance, green spaces and forests) while negatively affecting utility in the case of pollutants.  
8 In the very first models, utility had to be maximized on the optimal path (Hamilton, Clemens, 1999), but 
non optimal models have been developed afterwards (namely Dasgupta, Mäler (2000) and Asheim, 
Weitzman (2001)). 
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conception of sustainability is thus in line with Pezzey (1989) who defines sustainability as a non 
declining value of utility. A negative ANS at a point in time means that future utility is 
unavoidably be less than current utility over some period and indicates that the economy is on an 
unsustainable path (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999).  In other words, the economy does not invest 
enough with regard to the optimization objective. 
2.2  The Normative Implications of the ANS Conceptual Framework 
 
The above-mentioned conception of sustainability, which intrinsically associates utility and 
assets, raises four concerns.  
 
First, devoting to the representative agent a central place, it is anchored in a methodological 
individualism that prevents from grasping the evolution of collective welfare as such. Yet, the 
World Bank considers that intangible capital, including human capital and the quality of formal 
and informal institutions, is preponderant in an enlarged conception of wealth:  “Intangible assets 
(…) includes social capital, that is, the trust among people in a society and their ability to work 
together for a common purpose” (World Bank, 2006, p. 18). While such a theoretical conception 
of intangible capital might include collective elements, the fact that ANS is conceived as an 
aggregate measure leaves little space for thinking of the collective nature of social or institutional 
capitals. Alternative approaches, as in the Index of Social Health (Miringoff and Miringoff, 1995) 
for instance, have shown their better ability to grasp the impact of social context and interactions 
on the evolution of intangible wealth. More fundamentally, such an individualistic framework 
does not allow for thinking of distributional concerns, like income inequalities, as affecting 
sustainability (defined as the maximization of welfare overtime). Does it mean that inequalities 
play no role in the sustainability of a society? As soon as it is known that different types of 
inequalities may be reinforcing, one might believe that they constitute an important factor of 
sustainability: “… certain inequalities may be mutually reinforcing. Gender disparities (…) are 
typically much larger for households with lower socio-economic status: in many developing 
countries, the combined effect of gender and socio-economic status is often to exclude young 
women in poor households from attending school and getting rewarding jobs, denying them 
possibilities of self-expression and political voice, and exposing them to hazards that put their 
health at risk” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p. 55)
9. Alternative measures, whose conceptual framework 
does not deeply diverge from the ANS one, suggest weighting negatively the degree of income 
inequality in the measure of sustainability. This is the case, among others, of the Index of 
Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW, Daly and Cobb, 1989) and of the Genuine Progress 
Indicator (GPI, Talberth, Cobb, Slattery, 2006). 
 
Second, linking of welfare to the maximization of the present value of a utility function that 
namely depends on consumption illustrates a productivist/consumerist vision of sustainability. 
This prevents from thinking of sustainability and welfare across time without maintaining or 
increasing the level of consumption, whatever its nature. Such a conception does not leave any 
space for thinking of prosperity without growth 
 (Jackson, 2009). Even if wealth is enlarged to 
                                                 
9 Many other studies have shown how inequalities affect welfare. See, for instance, Wilkinson, R.G. 
(2005). 
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environmental, social and personal dimensions, as soon as wealth is understood as the discounted 
value of future consumptions, it cannot be seen out of a consumerist perspective. Such a drift is 
well illustrated in what follows: “having a high level of schooling, being in good health or 
benefiting from a large social network are also some forms of current wealth that enlarge one’s 
perspectives of earning money, consuming and/or enjoying life at later periods” (Fleurbaey, 2008 
in Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.251). 
 
Third, in a theoretical framework where the environment is only grasped by the utility function of 
a representative agent, nature is only considered through the goods and services that can be 
extracted from it (assimilation capacity, life-support function, production and consumption 
goods). From this framework, the “existence value” of resources is excluded, that is, the value 
people place on the existence of assets regardless of their consumption (Everett and Wilks, 1997; 
Falconi, 1999). This perception of sustainability carries an instrumental vision of the relationship 
between mankind and nature. Theoretically, this instrumental conception, underlying the idea of 
mankind mastering nature, should not be problematic since, though it implies a risk of spoiling 
nature, it also suggests the possibility for mankind to contribute to nature’s emancipation. 
However, the ANS framework renders this instrumental relationship between mankind and nature 
questionable from a normative perspective as soon as it assumes a rate of time preference, 
discounting the future with regard to the present. This leaves the ground to short-term logics 
(instrumentalizing nature in production and consumption), at the cost of long-term ones (rather 
acting in favour of nature preservation), the former generally going against the latter. If the 
preference of the short-run on the long-run reflects empirical individual behaviours, such a 
conceptual framework, taking act of this preference and being based on it, does not fully exploit 
the power of an indicator to shape a new reality, by not theoretically constituting any incentive 
for attitudinal changes. 
 
This leads to a fourth more fundamental concern lying in the vagueness of what sustainability 
eventually is. If time preferences are such that the short-run is preferable than the long-run, one 
might imagine that the implicit weight of consumption in the utility function becomes far higher 
than the weight of environmental services. In such a case, a sustained utility would not 
necessarily coincide with a sustained level of long-term investment in enlarged assets. This 
relationship should be questioned further. This is currently not the case in the green accounting 
literature, where a conceptual fuzziness remains, as we have shown above: sustainability is 
sometimes defined as the non declining value of utility (Pezzey, 1989), implying that 
sustainability is first and foremost a “subjective” matter (mediated by the representative agent) 
and sometimes as the non-declining value of all assets (Hamilton, Atkinson, Pearce, 1997), 
sustainability being then purely “technical”. Of course, the link between net measures (such as net 
national product and adjusted net savings) and social well-being or welfare has been questioned 
in the literature. Hamilton and Ruta (2009) raise the question: “How much social welfare has 
changed when a natural resource is extracted?”. Dasgupta and Mäler (2000) theoretically 
establish the linkage between net savings, social welfare and sustainable development for the 
enlarged context of non optimal economies. Asheim and Weitzman (2001) show that an 
appropriate consumption price index implies that the growth in net national product indicates a 
change in social welfare. But these works do not fundamentally question the implications of 
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associating utility (whatever the way it is designed) and investment in assets (whatever assets it 
includes) on the definition of sustainability as a desirable societal objective. Questioning this 
apparent inextricability between utility and assets investment should highlight the determinants 
and finalities of sustainability as a political target as well as better define the limits and 
orientations of the relationships between mankind and nature. 
 
To sum up, while the ANS is praised by many economists for its theoretical anchorage in a 
consistent conceptual framework, no explicit consideration is made on the normative conceptions 
and consequences such a framework entails. Though we have seen that the neoclassical 
framework underlying the ANS already shapes a singular conception of sustainability : it is 
anchored in a methodological individualism impeding to think of the collective determinants of 
welfare overtime and to integrate distributional issues; it maintains sustainability in a consumerist 
perspective where economic growth remains central; it carries an anthropocentric vision of the 
mankind-nature relationship; and eventually it leaves a heavy imprecision on the nature of 
sustainability as targeting utility or assets. 
 
Going from the conceptual framework to the technical construction of the ANS, one observes that 
such a neoclassical conception is enhanced, encompassing a highly normative span. This is 
developed in sections 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
 
 
3  Substitutability: “Weak Sustainability” 
 
 
By gathering heterogeneous types of capital in a same unit and summing them up, the ANS 
assumes, to a certain degree, their substitutability. Such an assumption constitutes a “weak 
sustainability” approach. Following this approach, if Brazil destroys all Amazonian forests and 
invests the sales proceeds in education expenditures, the ANS will remain unchanged or might 
even increase. Accordingly, Brazil would be on a “sustainable” path (Pillarisetti and van den 
Bergh 2008). 
 
From a normative perspective, such a “weak” conception has been widely contested. Some 
authors argue that it reflects the pervasive impact of increasingly using an economic register to 
approach nature. For a long time, the impact of human economic activity on nature was 
recognized, but not as something with which economic activity should concern itself. Holland 
(1999) observes, however, that the rise of ecological economics, fuelled by increasing concern at 
both the degree and kind of human impact upon the natural world, signals the fact that many 
economists no longer regard this attitude as acceptable. This recent awareness has given rise to 
many researches on ways of registering environmental impacts in economic terms.  
 
In this line, the ANS aims to enlarge the conceptions inherent to standard national accounting. It 
registers nature as a specific “capital” among others, all of them being summed up. To that 
respect, the substitutability assumption that allows for describing the net creation/destruction of 
enlarged wealth has a performative effect: as soon as the impact of mankind on nature receives an 
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economic “weight”, it becomes possible at the same time to offset the adverse environmental 
impacts against “beneficial” development elsewhere (Holland , 1999). Such an economist vision 
has been depicted by the tenant of deep ecology as being source of misrepresentations as well as 
of some kind of arrogance. In such types of measure, human response to nature is misrepresented 
because it is overestimated. Arrogance towards nature appears in the recurrent confusion between 
the world and the human world. Such misrepresentations and arrogance are challenged by the 
tenants of a “strong” sustainability, where ecological limitations are central and therefore 
substitutability between assets of different types is not allowed.  
 
Yet, Hamilton, Atkinson and Pearce (1997) have considered the issue of strong sustainability, 
following the idea that there is some amount of critical natural capital that must be preserved if 
welfare is to be maintained –  there are essentially no substitutes for certain natural assets (Pearce 
et al., 1989). These authors consider two generic types of natural capital to be maintained: the 
assimilative capacity of environment (which dissipates pollutants that are ultimately life-
threatening) and the critical stock of living natural resources that provide life-support functions. 
With respect to the latter capital, considering that “what constitutes an ‘excess’ is very much a 
matter of preferences” (Hamilton, Atkinson, Pearce, 1997, p. 19), the authors compare two 
optimization problems: the optimal exploitation of rainforest when only local preferences prevail 
and the optimal exploitation of rainforest when both local and global preferences come into play. 
It is assumed that a country with rainforest resources has preferences only for consumption of this 
resource, whatever the benefits there are to rainforest preservation, since these benefits are a 
global externality. The authors come to the conclusion that taking the world preferences into 
account, through global willingness to pay, leads to critical rainforest levels being preserved 
because externalities of preservation are internalized.  
 
If this conclusion theoretically holds and supports a perspective where ecological limitations 
matter, it raises a major concern on the empirical level. The authors recognize it themselves, 
assessing the global willingness to pay assumes that the externalities of deforestation are 
consciously perceived and evaluable in monetary terms though in fact it is far from being the 
case. The theoretical possibility of including strong sustainability issue seems to disappear as 
soon as it is concretely integrated in the ANS.  
 
A second empirical concern should be added here, which does not allow the ANS to be an 
indicator of strong sustainability. To the criticism of substitutability between capitals, one can 
answer that appropriate prices could reduce the degree of substitutability. Theoretically indeed, 
prices should reflect the scarcity of resources, implying that prices of resources tend to infinity 
over time as long as they are excessively extracted and contribute to resources depletion. But this 
is not the case empirically. As we shall see it in parts 5 and 6, natural resources and 
environmental damages are often underestimated, impeding the limitation of their substitutability 
with produced or human capitals.  
 
Both the concerns of difficult evaluation of willingness to pay and concrete obstacles to reduce 
substitutability through accurate price systems question the consistency of a monetary indicator 
for quantifying (or at least getting closer to) strong sustainability. To that end, physical 
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accounting indicator such as the Ecological Footprint (EF) seems more appropriate. The EF 
strongly stands against weak sustainability assumptions. No role is given to savings and capital 
accumulation: “any positive ecological surplus (biocapacity that exceeds the ecological footprint) 
does not entail an increase in some natural capital stock, and hence an improvement in future 
productive capacity. A fortiori, saving and accumulating manufactured or human capital does not 
help sustainability” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p. 71). Following the “strong” approach, each capital 
must be maintained at levels at least equal to those necessary for basic-life support functions and 
even higher in order to keep reasonable levels of environmental resilience, that is, the capacity of 
ecosystems to regenerate after a shock (Stiglitz et al., 2009).   
  
The same “sustainability” streamer thus encompasses very different visions of the world and 
conceptions of the link between mankind and nature. In terms of policy implications, this has far-
reaching consequences on the constraints a society should impose to itself in order to be 
“sustainable”.   
 
 
4  Human Wealth: Restricted to Human Capital and Measured through Education Inputs 
Rather than Outcomes  
 
 
The way the “human” dimension of the ANS has been theoretically conceived and quantified 
entails two concerns. First, human wealth appears to be restricted to human productive potential 
(4.1). Second, grasping human capital through education expenditures is questionable: focusing 
on education expenditures does not enable grasping the outcomes of the educational system 
(4.2.). 
4.1  Human Wealth Reduced to its Productive Potential 
 
In a conception of extended wealth, the “human capital” dimension of the ANS aims at 
broadening the traditional definition of what constitutes an asset. “There exist additional stocks 
(…), whose contribution to production is difficult to deny yet which are not considered assets (…) 
perhaps the most important of these is the knowledge, experience and skills embodied in a 
nation’s populace, its so-called human capital”(Bolt et al., 2002, p.7).  
 
However, contrasting with this claimed objective, the ANS theoretical framework conceives 
human capital as one of the various capitals composing a production function. Upstream of the 
construction of the ANS, this entails a productivist perspective of what human wealth is. 
Reducing human wealth to its productive capacities, the ANS conceptual framework leaves little 
space to a more comprehensive vision of human nature; a vision that would enlarge the scope of 
the human wealth to be transmitted to the future generations to many other dimensions, such as, 
among many others, social cohesion, respect, altruism and culture. In terms of normative 
prescriptions, the productivist perspective of the ANS could lead to restrictive propositions, as the 
following EU parliament suggestion well illustrates it: “As human capital investments are 
included in the Genuine Savings, this indicator could support the Lisbon Agenda of the EU of 
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creating a competitive ‘knowledge based economy’ ” (EU parliament, 2007, p.37). In such a 
perspective, one might wonder whether philosophy or literature would be considered as 
contributing to the “competitiveness” of a knowledge based economy, and whether it would in 
turn benefit from any investment.  
 
Conceiving human capital through its productive potential tends to shape the conception of 
sustainability as a transmission of productive human resources rather than the transmission of a 
larger cultural patrimony which is though highlighted by UNESCO as “a mainspring of our 
cultural diversity”,  its maintenance being “a guarantee for continuing creativity”
10.   
4.2  Measuring Education through Inputs Rather than Outcomes 
 
Considering that human capital depends for a large part on the educational system, the authors of 
the ANS evaluate this dimension by expenditures on education
11. It is assumed that a dollar of 
educational expenditure translates into a dollar increase in human capital (Ferreira and Vincent, 
2005), the latter thus being accounted from the cost. Besides the fact that this assumption has 
been proved poor (Jorgenson and Fraumeni, 1992, Schultz, 1988, in Ferreira and Vincent, 2005), 
it raises a major concern: considering education through its expenditure does not allow for 
evaluating the outcomes of the educational system. Expenditures on education give no 
information on the nature and the impacts of education on the members of a society and on the 
way they live together. For instance, higher expenditures on computers at school might enhance 
the technological breakage between pupils who have a computer at home and those who don’t. 
Expenditures on education do not inform either, as the ANS theoretical framework would yet 
require, on the ability of education to enhance productivity.  
 
Other indicators adopt a far different approach to assess education. The Human Development 
Index (HDI), for instance, encompasses school enrolment and alphabetisation. What are targeted 
here are the outcomes rather than the inputs. This indicator – in line with the capabilities 
approach – targets the ability of educated people to get access to sources of self-emancipation 
individually and collectively (Sen , 1999). This brings us back to the question raised in section 
4.1. on the scope of human wealth : by implicitly assuming that education has an intrinsic value 
in providing individuals with the key for accessing informed and conscious lives, the HDI 
broadens the scope of what should be transmitted to future generations from productive potential 
to human flourishing.  
 
The fact of focusing on the inputs rather than on the outcomes has an important normative scope. 
According as expenditures are invested in an educational system favouring competitiveness or in 
a system rather fostering capabilities and sources of human flourishing, the nature of the human 
wealth to be transmitted in a ‘sustainable’ society in the future deeply differs. 
                                                 
10 UNESCO: http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg=00002  
11 More precisely, human capital variation is accounted as non-fixed capital expenditures on education, the 
fixed-capital (as school buildings for example) being already accounted as investment in national 
accounting. The ANS estimate of investment in human capital is a purely gross measure, which makes no 
allowance for losses in human capital (Ferreira and Vincent, 2005). 
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Natural Resources Depletion: Contestable Pricing of Nature and Allocation of 
Responsibilities 
 
The ANS embraces changes in natural wealth through two dimensions: “natural resources 
depletion” (treated in this section) and pollution damages (see section 6). Natural resources 
depletion is by far the most discussed dimension in green accounting and ecological literatures. 
Two main issues are at stake: the way nature is priced is contestable (5.1.) and the way resource 
extraction is imputed enhances inequalities between developing and developed countries (5.2.).    
4.3  Contestable Pricing of Nature 
 
The renewable and non-renewable natural resources accounted in the ANS include natural gas, 
hard coal, lignite/soft coal/brown coal, oil, metals and minerals (bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, 
nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc) and forests (Bolt et al., 2002)
12. The way these resources are 
priced is questionable. Natural resources depletion is obtained by subtracting the rent of natural 
resources from the standard savings in national accounts. The rent is measured as the market 
value of extracted material minus the average extraction cost.  In the specific case of forests (the 
only renewable resource included in the ANS) rent is calculated as the rent on the amount of 
extraction which exceeds the natural increment in wood volume (Neumayer, 2000, Bolt et al., 
2002). Formally, the resources rents to be deducted are computed as follows:  
 
R AC P ). (   
 
where P is the resource price, AC is the average cost and R is the quantity of resources extracted. 
The rents of these assets are valued at the so-called Hotelling-rent, which is the maximum rent 
that could be obtained overtime while emptying the stock of resources. In the ANS, the more 
readily available average costs are used as a proxy for the theoretically correct marginal costs 
(Neumayer, 2000)
  13. According to the Hotelling rule, in an efficient exploitation of non-
renewable resources, the percentage change in net-price per unit of time should equal the discount 
rate in order to maximize the actualized value of resource. In other words, the price of an 
exhaustible resource is expected to increase autonomously over time.  
 
The ANS uses the current prices of resources in order to evaluate natural resources. This 
monetization of nature’s value brings up three issues.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Empirically, the adjustment for natural resource depletion in the ANS proves to improve significantly the 
relation between estimates of the ANS and subsequent changes in consumption (Ferreira, Hamilton, 
Vincent, 2008). 
13 Hamilton and Clemens (1999, p. 339) mention a methodological problem implied by the use of average 
rather than marginal cost of extraction : from a theoretical point of view, depletion estimates depend on 
scarcity rents which should be measured as price minus marginal cost, while in practice, data on marginal 
production cost are almost never available. This implies the use of average extraction costs which tends to 
overstate calculated resource rents and hence to understate genuine savings. 
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First, if market prices can be used to evaluate stocks and flows on a perfectly competitive market 
(implying perfect information), it is not the case as soon as we consider nature, which 
encompasses many externalities and imperfect information. Theoretically, the ANS values 
produced assets and the changes in the various stocks of natural resources and pollutants at the 
shadow prices
14 supporting the optimal path – scarcity rents in the case of natural resources, 
marginal damages in the case of pollutants. However, as Ferreira and Vincent (2005) discuss, in 
real-world economies, market prices surely diverge from the shadow-price estimates required for 
the theoretical ANS to reflect sustainability. To which extent is it then consistent to rely on 
market prices? Theoretically, prices should reflect the scarcity of resources, implying that prices 
of exhaustible resources tend to infinity over time. But in reality, in the context of imperfect 
competition, prices are not increasing at the rate of resources depletion, and therefore do not 
constitute a good resource allocation signal anymore. As a response to the non accuracy of market 
prices to signal resources allocation, theory would suggest to create “accounting prices”. This 
would require modeling the long-term consequences of given changes in environmental capital 
and how they impact future well-being (Stiglitz et al., 2009). Such pricing leaves much space for 
speculations about future developments, which enhances the sources of disagreements and 
renders any practical implementation difficult today.  
  
Second, the way the rent is computed strongly determines which countries are on a “sustainable” 
path and which are not. Some authors have shown how computing rents another way around 
could lead to dramatically different results. This is the case of Davis and Moore (2000) who have 
shown that valuing resource assets at the current rental rate may provide biased estimates of asset 
values. Neumayer (2000) explores two competing methods for computing natural resources rents. 
The first one, method of Repetto, includes resources discoveries in the formula. Resource rent is 
computed as follows: 
 
) ).( ( D R AC P    
 
In such a computation, the correction term in the ANS can be positive if D > R¸ the rate of 
discovery being higher than the rate of depletion.  
 









 1 ) 1 (
1
. ). ( n r
R AC P  
 
where r is the discount rate and n is the number of remaining years of the resource stock if 
production was the same in the future as in the base year. More soon as r > 0 and n > 0, this 
computation gives a smaller deduction term than with the ANS method. Such a computation is 
                                                 
14 The shadow-price is to be understood as the cost of strengthening the constraint of the optimization 
problem. In our case, the constraint namely encompasses limited natural resources and pollutants. In this 
line, strengthening the constraint means decreasing the amount of limited natural resources, increasing the 
pollution associated to the production, etc. The value of the shadow price is determined by solving the 
optimization problem. 
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derived from the idea that receipts from non-renewable resource extraction should not fully count 
as ‘sustainable income’ since resource extraction decreases the resource stock and thus brings 
with it an element of depreciation of the resource capital stock (Neumayer, 2000). For Neumayer, 
the ‘El Serafy’-method is superior. Following the current computation of the rents in the ANS, a 
country that would be completely dependent on resources exploitation, like Saudi-Arabia for 
instance, could never have a positive ANS, as all resources rents are counted as capital 




A third reason why the pricing of nature is questionable relates to the impact of the market 
structures on the value of depletion. Going back to the seminal principles of classical political 
economy, we know that the long-term equilibrium of the firm in perfect competition gives rise to 
a higher quantity exchanged and to a lower rent than in monopoly. This would imply that the 
depletion evaluated through the rent would appear lower in the competitive case than in the 
monopolistic one, while in fact, the depletion would have been higher. This question should lead 
to further investigations.     
4.4  Resources Depletion: Imputation of the Costs  
 
Following the methodology of the ANS, the depletion of non-renewable resources is imputed to 
countries that extract natural resources, mostly resources-exporting developing countries. This 
means that the image conveyed by the indicator puts into light the unsustainable path of exporting 
countries rather than questioning the consumption patterns of importing countries
16.  “One may 
feel uneasy in front of the message conveyed by the ANS regarding resources (e.g. oil) exporting 
countries. In such exporting countries, unsustainability only comes from an insufficient rate of 
reinvestment of the rents generated by the exploitation of the natural resource, and “over-
consumption” by importing countries is not an issue at all. Developed countries, generally less 
endowed in natural resources but richer in human and physical capital than developing ones, 
would then unduly appear sustainable”(Stiglitz et al., 2009, p. 283). To this regard, the World 
Disaster Report 2001 notes that contrary to what the ANS would suggest, many advanced 
                                                 
15 Both Repetto and El Serafy methods belong to the literature on exhaustible resource accounting. To that 
respect, Hamilton and Ruta (2009) shed light on the contrast that distinguishes this empirical literature, 
which implicitly accounts for resource depletion as a change in the total asset value, from the theoretical 
literature on wealth accounting and social welfare, which considers the change in real asset value. While 
the former is the sum of produced capital and the value of natural resource stock given by the present value 
of total rents, the change in real wealth theoretically values depletion at the marginal rental rate (owing to 
optimality). Looking at practical asset accounting, the authors come to the conclusion that in all cases the 
change in total wealth (including capital or holding gains) is greater than the change in real wealth: “for a 
typical situation with a 25 year reserve life and asocial discount rate of 4%, the value of depletion using 
the change in real asset value is about 70% larger than that suggested by the El Serafy formula” 
(Hamitlton and Ruta (2009), p. 62). This distinction in exhaustible resources accounting, the authors argue, 
has far-reaching consequences: the change in total wealth overstates the impact of saving on social welfare. 
16 Everett and Wilks (1999), Pillarisetti (2005), Falconi (1999). This imputation to producers is also the 
case for ISEW and GPI. 
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The problem is worsened by the fact that the changes in the terms-of-trade between resource 
importers and exporters are not grasped through the pricing system of the ANS. As 
aforementioned, the Hotelling rule is assumed: resource rents are supposed to rise over time, thus 
providing the resource exporter with improving terms-of-trade. Yet, the resource importer which 
faces a future deterioration of its terms-of-trade should make an extra-adjustment for the 
increasing scarcity of resources. But the ANS does not accurately reflect this future increase in 
price. As a consequence, an exporter of non-renewable resources which would not have 
reinvested the entirety of the income currently derived from a resource sale could have negative 
ANS while still ensuring weak sustainability (van der Ploeg, 2010). Reversely, a resource 
importer could display a positive ANS while not doing the necessary endeavours in order to be 
weakly sustainable: “(…) when prices are non competitive, the importing country is able to pay 
its imports less than would be required for efficiency, it will have a responsibility in global non-
sustainability that is not captured by the money-value of its imports. Low prices allow this 
country to over-consume and to transfer the long-term costs of this over-consumption to the 
exporting country” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.78). 
 
Such an asymmetric representation of the environmental burden has far-reaching consequences as 
soon as this indicator is used for addressing policy conclusions, as in Atkinson and Hamilton 
(1996) and Hamilton et al. (1997). These authors tentatively suggested making aid conditional for 
developing countries who fail to pass the test of weak sustainability, that is, for countries having a 
negative ANS.  
 
As a consequence, a case has been made by some authors for imputing consumption of 
exhaustible resources to their final consumers, i.e. the importing countries. This is done in the 
Ecological Footprint, which measures the net consumption of bio-productive earth resources. 
This type of measure, computed as “national production – exports + imports”, better takes into 
account the gap, in certain countries, between consumption and production. (Boutaud and 
Gondran, 2008).  
 
 
5  Pollution damages 
 
 
The last item to be deducted from net savings consists in the global damages from carbon dioxide 
emissions. The data is published in the World Bank Development Indicators and the source is the 
Carbon Dioxide Analysis Centre.  “The global marginal social cost of a metric ton of carbon 
emitted is assumed to $20 in 1995 (…) This is deflated for other years using the USA GDP 
deflator” (Bolt et al., 2002, p.19)
18. 
                                                 
17 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2001, in Pillarisetti (2005). 
 
18 Estimates of air pollution damages for the last 5 years are to be found in World Bank (2009). 
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The monetary estimation of CO2 damages raises the same concerns of uncertainty and 
arbitrariness as for the natural resources depletion. “It is debatable whether valuing CO2 
emissions with 20US$ per tonne of carbon is sufficient to account for damage caused by 
greenhouse gases” (Neumayer, 2000, p. 273). This pricing is moreover questionable in its 
anthropocentric roots: the CO2 price is determined on a CO2 market, only depending on human 
supply and demand for it. The difficulty of pricing CO2 is the object of a huge literature which 
will not be reviewed here. Our specific insight is related to the fact that CO2 damages, as 
calculated in the ANS, implicitly raise the critical issue of ecological responsibilities, at least in 
two respects.  
 
First, the way CO2 is priced, and thus implicitly weighted with regard to the other dimensions of 
the ANS, almost erases CO2 damages from the indicator: “Under the current state of the art, the 
prices used to value carbon emissions in existing estimates of ANS are not able to give it any 
significant role in the global assessment of sustainability, and this casts doubts on the usefulness 
of the indicator as a guide for policy” (Stiglitz et al., 2009). If the ANS is to signal the risk that a 
country is on an unsustainable path, the relative weight of CO2 damages as currently computed 
prevents this indicator from pointing out the global ecological responsibility of the highest 
carbon-emitting countries.  
 
Second, the way the world share of CO2 emissions are imputed globally is very questionable in 
terms of responsibilities. In line with the Kyoto agreement, CO2 emissions are imputed to the 
production:  if production is intensively devoted to exports, the responsibility of CO2 emissions of 
the exporting countries is over-estimated, while the responsibility of the importing countries is 
underestimated. This constitutes an important bias in favor of the over-emitting countries
19.  
 
More fundamentally, one can wonder why the environmental degradation is only grasped through 
the CO2 emissions damages. “One major shortcoming of the ANS (…) is the fact that the 
adjustment for environmental degradation is limited to global pollution damages from carbon 
dioxide emissions” (Stiglitz et al., 2009, p.278). This observation leads us to enlarge the scope of 
the argument to both pollution damages and resources depletion: some crucial ecological aspects 
are missing in the ANS, their absence being justified by a lack of available data. Their authors 
recognize this lack: “the calculations are not comprehensive in that they do not include some 
important sources of environmental degradation such as underground water depletion, 
unsustainable fisheries, and soil degradation” (World Bank, 2006, p.154). Nonetheless, as soon 
as this indicator is presented as assessing sustainability, such a lack should be at least broadly 
mentioned and at best filled in.  
 
 
                                                 
19 Pillarisetti (2005) adds to these two concerns of responsibility in CO2  emissions a very interesting 
perspective on the misleading interpretations of CO2/GDP ratio of the ANS.  
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6  Conclusion 
 
The ANS certainly constitutes a considerable step in the search for new political tools. The fact 
that this indicator, which tackles a global issue, emanates from a global institution enhances its 
potential influence on the coordination, at the international level, of national sustainability 
policies. More fundamentally, it aims at enlarging the conception of “wealth”, offering more 
space to intangible wealth and to the environment in the decision-making.  
 
However, even though such imperative issues are taken into account by the ANS, the way they 
are computed dramatically narrows the scope of what  is considered.  From the conceptual 
framework of the ANS, one observes that natural resources, environmental quality and human 
capital are only conceived in their productive dimension. As soon as we consider that indicators 
are not only a passive reflect of a reality but do shape this reality, one might feel uncomfortable 
to observe that the ANS is wedged in a productivist approach.  Such a perspective leaves very 
little space for considering the systemic reasons why societies are today on a globally 
unsustainable path. Nor does it allow for thinking of a conception of sustainability which would 
not be anchored in a dynamic of sustained production/consumption.  If the creation of the ANS 
illustrates the intention of opening the scope of traditional conceptions of wealth and of 
enhancing this enlarged wealth notion’s influence in the decision-making spheres, its computation 
however narrows this scope by implicitly carrying an a priori singular – productivist – approach 
of what sustainability is and, inextricably, should be. 
 
These upriver normative foundations, on which we have shed light here above, are crystallized in 
the methodological choices on which the ANS has been built. The assumption of substitutability 
between capitals restricts the possibility for ecological limits to be considered as having to 
constrain societies’ ways of life. From the ANS perspective, as long as the level of investment in 
human or produced capital is sufficient enough to compensate for non-renewable resources 
depletion, the economy remains on a sustainable path. What is more, considering human capital 
rather than human wealth restricts human beings to their productivity, leaving no space for 
“economically unproductive” sources of human wealth (institutions ensuring democratic 
functioning of societies, altruism, social cohesion, respect, etc.). In addition, grasping “human 
capital” through expenditures on education does not allow for judging on the outcomes of such 
expenditures. As far as natural resources are concerned, evaluating them on a monetary basis has 
been justified by practical reasons. These motives have surreptitiously avoided more fundamental 
questions: to what extent are market prices a good resource allocation signal?  Are they able to 
reflect the life-support function of nature and its value independently of serving production? Do 
market prices give a consistent weighting of the different dimensions of the ANS? Moreover, the 
fact that resources extraction costs are imputed to resources extractors has far-reaching 
consequences. It puts the burden of resources depletion on the producing countries (most of them 
being poor), rather than on the consuming countries (mostly rich), whose over-consumption is not 
denounced. Such a methodological choice could prove to be crucial, would the ANS become a 
criterion for accessing to financial aid. 
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The decomposition of the ANS has illustrated how a measure that uninformed people could 
consider as “neutral”, implicitly carries values and world visions. The latter are to influence the 
reality reflected by the indicator and the decision made on its basis. Such a normative span is 
inherent to any indicator. That is why such a critical reading of indicators is pivotal today, at a 
moment where a singularly large amount of alternative measures to GDP is being broadly 
discussed. If there is an increasing awareness that what we count influences what we do, we have 
highlighted that the way we count it is just as crucial. Indicators are to be increasingly used as a 
tool in the decision-making. Their role is even more essential: they shape the societal objectives 
to be reached. In this sense, the critical exercise developed here above should be applied for any 
other indicator. Not clarifying the implicit values carried by a measure while discussing it would 
dupe citizens on the democratic aspect of the debate to which they take part.    
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